

Message Text

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05 COME-00 EB-08 FRB-03

TRSE-00 XMB-02 OPIC-03 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01 /126 W

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R 140954Z SEP 78

FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8470

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BANGUI

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

DIA WASHDC

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CINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

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TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, PDEV, SU

SUBJECT: SUDAN FOREIGN POLICY IMPERATIVES: AN UPDATE

REF: (A) KHARTOUM 0836, (B) KHARTOUM 3897 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: ON EVE OF NIMEIRI'S VISIT TO U.S., SUDANESE FOREIGN
POLICY CONTINUES TO BE GUIDED LARGELY BY SECURITY CONCERNS AND

NEED TO OBTAIN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM MANY ARAB AND OTHER COUNTRIES SO THAT AMBITIOUS DEVELOPMENT GOALS CAN BE ACHIEVED. WHILE NIMEIRI HAS CONTINUED TO ATTEMPT MAINTAIN FREINDLY RELATIONS WITH ANTAGONISTIC REGIMES IN LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA, HIS SUSPICION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST HAS, IF ANYTHING, INTENSIFIED. SUDANGOV FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT THIS SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES IS TO DEVELOP VERY CLOSE TIES WITH RELATIVELY SMALL GROUP OF KEY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING U.S., WHILE MAINTAINING GENERALLY FREINDLY RELATIONS WITH ALMOST ALL COUNTRIES OF WORLD ESPECIALLY THOSE IN ARAB, AFRICAN, THIRD WORLD GROUP. END SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT NIMEIRI WILL BE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, SECRETARY VANCE AND OTHERS NEXT WEEK, AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST, WILL BE VERY MUCH ON HIS MIND. REF A, WHICH WAS WRITTEN IN FEBRUARY, DESCRIBED FUNDAMENTAL IMPERATIVES BEHIND NIMEIRI'S FOREIGN POLICY, AND WE BELIEVE JUDGEMENTS EXPRESSED IN THAT MESSAGE REMAIN VALID. AS BACKGROUND FOR NEXT WEEK'S MEETINGS, FOLLOWING REVIEWS THESE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND BROAD DIRECTIONS OF SUDANESE FOREIGN POLICY.

2. ONE OF MOST BASIC OBJECTIVES OF NIMEIRI REGIME IS TO DEVELOP VAST ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF SUDAN SO THAT, AS HE HAS SAID, COUNTRY WILL NO LONGER BE ONE OF LEAST DEVELOPED, POOREST COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE WITH CONSIDERABLE
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FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND INVESTMENT. THEREFORE, PRINCIPAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE IS TO OBTAIN SUCH ASSISTANCE EITHER BILATERALLY OR THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE RESPONDED MOST POSITIVELY, WHICH ARE ALSO THE ONES WHICH LARGELY DETERMINE POLICIES OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES, ARE U.S., EEC COUNTRIES, SCANDINAVIANS, CHINA AND WEALTHY ARAB STATES.

3. DESPITE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN MORE URGENT AND THEREFORE HAVE EVEN HIGHER PRIORITY. NIMEIRI'S SECURITY CONCERNS, IN FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT, BEGIN WITH SUDANESE ANSAR EXILES, PRINCIPALLY IN LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA, WHO IN PAST HAVE TRIED TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO CONCERNED WITH EVER-PRESENT POTENTIAL THREAT FROM ABROAD AGAINST STABILITY IN SOUTHERN REGION AND ATTEMPTS TO CAUSE NORTH-SOUTH FRICTION IN SUDAN. IN ADDITION TO THESE INTERNALLY-BASED PROBLEMS, WHICH, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, ALSO GREATLY AFFECT DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND, INDEED, DEVELOPMENT EFFORT ITSELF, ARE EXTREMELY UNSTABLE OR CIVIL WAR CIRCUMSTANCES IN NEIGHBORING CHAD AND ETHIOPIA. ERITREA IS PROBABLY LARGEST WAR PRESENTLY ACTIVELY BEING FOUGHT IN WORLD AND REFUGEE FLOW INTO SUDAN ALONE IS AN ENORMOUS PROBLEM.

4. THUS, NIMEIRI AND HIS GOVERNMENT FACED IN EAST WITH
ERITREAN WAR, SUDANESE EXILE BANDS AND GENERALLY ANTAGONISTIC
REGIME IN ETHIOPIA WITH WHICH SUDAN SHARES ONE THOUSAND MILE
BORDER. IN WEST WEAK REGIME IN NDJAMENA FACES LIBYAN-BACKED
REBELS IN NORTHERN HALF OF COUNTRY. SUDANESE EXILES EXIST IN
LIBYA RULED BY ERRATIC AND ANTAGONISTIC QADDAFI. ELSEWHERE,
IN KENYA, UGANDA, ZAIRE AND CAE, SUDANESE SEE EITHER FRIENDLY
BUT WEAK REGIMES OR COUNTRIES RULED BY PEOPLE LIKE IDI AMIN
WHO IS NOT TRUSTED.

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CINCEUR FOR POLAD

5. TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE, NIMEIRI HAS TRIED TO ASSIST CHAD-
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GOV REACH ACCOMMODATION WITH REBELS, HAS CONTINUED TRENDS NOTED REF A WHERE HE HAS TRIED MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH LIBYAN AND ETHIOPIAN REGIMES DESPITE LIMITED SUCCESS AND MUTUAL DISTRUST, AND HE CONTINUES GOOD DAY-TO-DAY RELATIONS WITH OTHER NEIGHBORS. IN SHORT, HE TRYING TO USE WHATEVER DIPLOMATIC TOOLS ARE AVAILABLE TO REDUCE PRESSURES ALONG HIS BORDERS AND THEREBY MAINTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY. AS PART OF DOMESTIC RECONCILIATION HE ALSO TRYING TO ARRANGE RETURN OF SUDANESE EXILES FROM LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA, BUT TO DATE HE HAS LITTLE TO SHOW FOR HIS EFFORTS.

6. NIMEIRI AND HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISORS BELIEVE PROBLEM GOES BEYOND LIBYA OR ETHIOPIA. RATHER, FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS SOVIET PRESENCE IN REGION. AS LONG AS SOVIETS RELENTLESSLY PURSUE LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN MIDDLE EAST, NILE VALLEY AND AFRICA, PROBLEMS SUCH AS THOSE SUDAN FACES WITH LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA WILL CONTINUE. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT IF SOVIETS CAN BE EXPELLED FROM ETHIOPIA, MENGISTU, WHO IS BASICALLY A NON-COMMUNIST NATIONALIST, WILL PROVE MORE REASONABLE REGARDING ERITREA WHICH LIES AT HEART SUDAN-ETHIOPIA DIFFERENCES. SIMILARLY, SUDANESE ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA AND CHAD.

7. CONCERN OVER SOVIET OBJECTIVES ALSO IS IMPORTANT IN SUDANESE VIEW OF MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. THEY FEAR RADICALIZATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AS LONG AS PROBLEMS THERE REMAIN UNSOLVED, AND THEY SEE SOVIETS MAKING INROADS IN SYRIA AND ELSEWHERE IN REGION AS LONG AS NO PROGRESS IS MADE IN ACHIEVING PEACE THERE. IN THAT CONNECTION, NIMEIRI FERVENTLY WISHES SEE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE SOLVED PEACEFULLY LARGELY BECAUSE HE IS CONCERNED OVER DANGERS WHICH WILL RESULT CLOSER TO HOME AS LONG AS ATTENTION IS DIVERTED BY WORLD COMMUNITY TO MIDDLE EAST.

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8. SUDAN'S SECURITY CONCERNS, ESPECIALLY TO EXTENT THAT THEY RELATE TO SOVIET ACTIVITIES ARE MORE THAN NIMEIRI GOVERNMENT CAN COPE WITH ALONE. THUS, AS WITH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, HE

HAS TURNED TO SELECTED COUNTRIES FOR ASSISTANCE, AND TO GREAT EXTENT THEY ARE SAME ONES NOTED ABOVE. NIMEIRI SEEKS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, CHINA, U.K., FRANCE, GERMANY AND U.S.

9. EXCEPT FOR SPECIAL CASE OF CHINA, NIMEIRI SEEKS FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN MIDDLE EAST. THESE COUNTRIES GENERALLY, BOTH ON ECONOMIC ISSUES AND IN POLITICAL/STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, ARE MODERATE. IN DEALING WITH THEM AND SEEKING THEIR SUPPORT, NIMEIRI'S OWN MODERATE INCLINATIONS ARE STRENGTHENED. NIMEIRI HAS OBTAINED SUPPORT FROM SEVERAL SOURCES AND IS THEREFORE BEHOLDEN TO NO ONE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, WITHOUT SAUDI ASSISTANCE SUDAN WOULD BE IN SEVERE DIFFICULTY. IT ALSO SHOULD BE NOTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE LONG, DEEP AND EXTENSIVE RELATIONSHIP, AND THE MANY SPECIAL FACTORS THAT TIE THESE TWO COUNTRIES TOGETHER, EGYPT-SUDAN RELATIONS ARE UNIQUE. I BELIEVE THAT IN SUDANESE EYES THE U.S. ALSO HAS A VERY SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY AND RELATIONS WITH U.S. ARE GRADUALLY EVOLVING AS THIRD MOST IMPORTANT SET OF BILATERAL RELATIONS FOR SUDAN. THIS RELATIONSHIP WILL BE EXPLORED SEPTTEL (NOTAL).
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